Deciphering the Fightnomics “Uber Tale of the Tape”

Deciphering the Fightnomics “Uber Tale of the Tape”



“Showdown” Joe Ferraro is quite a character. A TV and radio personality and host of Canada’s



“UFC Central” show, Joe was the very first MMA media interview I ever did. During our

conversation about the basics of the Tale of the Tape we talked a little about why it’s unfortunate that

we continue to use the same metrics that MMA inherited from boxing. The sport has its own identity

yet still languishes under the yoke of boxing’s ox collar in many ways. Aside from being on the

vanguard of recognizing the value of MMA analytics, Joe is also a licensed MMA referee, judge, and

promoter, which collectively influences his uniquely informed opinion about the sport and how it’s

presented to audiences. During that fateful interview he challenged me on what variables I would

suggest including on some sort of “new and improved Tale of the Tape.” So I set out to assemble

something that would harness the great deal of information we have on fighters based on their prior

performance and try to package it in (nearly) as small a Tale of the Tape.

The tool I have created to help me understand UFC matchups more succinctly, yet also more

informatively, is what I call my “Uber Tale of the Tape.” While we’ve already seen that the

traditional Tale of the Tape can offer some clues into the context of a certain matchup, the Uber tape

was a happy middle ground of additional performance metrics boiled down from a much larger list of

variables that I crunch prior to every UFC event. Über is a German prefix meaning a superlative

example of something. We can attach this prefix to a word or phrase to mean a version that is better,

the best, or above and beyond the norm. Those of you following @fightnomics on Twitter or read my

matchup analysis articles online will recognize this graphic immediately, but you may still have

questions about some of the variables that I show. Here’s an example that I will walk through in

detail that will help clarify a common tool that offers additional insight into each fight that you can

see on the TV screen.



Analysis revealed lots of performance advantages for Michael McDonald over Brad Pickett when they fought at the debut of the



UFC on FOX Sports 1 in August of 2013. McDonald won by submission after dominating the standup striking and knocking

Pickett down twice.



The “Bio” portion of the Uber Tape supplements some of the traditional information with the

addition of the fighting stance. Since the Southpaw Advantage is real, it’s important to note in a

matchup especially if an orthodox stance fighter is inexperienced. The bottom of the Bio section

shows how many minutes of analysis went into these metrics. Data usually includes all UFC, WEC

and Strikeforce fighters. Although FightMetric quantified some additional fights from other

promotions in their database, I exclude these due to less consistent matchmaking, lesser competition,

occasionally differing rules, and usually the fact that they took place a long time ago. The Analyzed

Minutes therefore demonstrate two important things. First, it shows how much experience the fighter

has competing at a high level, and second, it shows how big the sample size is for the rest of the Uber

Tape. The more minutes of data we have, the more confidently we can draw conclusions about the

relative strengths and weaknesses of each fighter. Small sample sizes mean the data can be skewed

heavily by a single fight, which may have been against a much tougher or easier opponent, causing the

metrics to sway accordingly. Usually, a few recent fights are all we need to understand the tendencies

and relative skills of a fighter.



In the Bio section, I only marked two variables to demonstrate advantages: age and reach. We’ve

already seen that height alone does not carry much of an advantage, unless it also comes with reach.

And we’ve also seen how critical age is for MMA. So these two metrics have been scored with a

check mark or “X” to indicate which fighter has an inherent advantage or disadvantage, respectively.

If one fighter was a Southpaw it would be listed, but not scored because it’s not a quantitative value.

Such are the limitations of my off-the-shelf charting tools. We’re also limited to just the data that the

UFC reports, although it’s certainly possible that new metrics like “leg reach” could come to market

soon.

The next level on the Uber Tape is Standup Striking Offense, and these five metrics summarize the

key performance variables that allow you to assess a fighter’s striking abilities. The first value is a

ratio of the total number of knockdowns scored to the number of knockdowns received (a glass jaw

disposition). Great strikers have a much higher first number, and a minimal second number. This is

also a hint to identifying fighters who have suffered some knockdowns, and who are therefore at

increased risk of going down early. The next value is the Distance Knockdown Rate, which

normalizes the punch-for-punch power for each fighter. As we covered in Chapter 3, Knockdown

Rate measures how many distance knockdowns were scored divided by how many landed power

head strikes it took to score them. It tracks who does more damage per strike. This value can be

compared directly to other fighters or to their weight class to get a relative indication of how

powerful a striker is, or just how good he is at finding the vulnerabilities of his opponents in causing

knockdowns. It’s even more telling when one fighter shows up as well above average while the other



is below, as is the case in this matchup example.

Further down we assess the accuracy of each fighter in terms of distance head striking. I’ve

broken out jabs and power strikes separately because many fighters will perform differently

depending on the strike’s strength. This allows us to differentiate fighters with a great jab but poor

power striking from others who use a lazy jab only to set up their precise power hand. The overall

averages for these metrics are 28% for jabs and 24% for power head strikes, but remember they do

vary slightly by weight class.

Last in the category is the Standup Strike Ratio. Regardless of what type of strike is thrown at

whatever target, I’m interested in knowing the total volume of standup strikes a fighter throws

compared to his opponents on average. A number of 1.0 indicates a completely even ratio and

represents a fighter who exactly matches the pace of his opponent. Ratios higher than 1.0 identify

fighters who tend to outwork their opponents and likely have more effective cage control. Fighters

with a ratio of less than 1.0 tend to get outworked by their opponents, and are on the receiving end of

more strikes than they are able to throw themselves. This is a supporting metric for the “Pace

Advantage.”

The Striking Defense metrics combine all distance head strikes to show what percentage is

avoided by the fighter. A higher number means fewer strikes get through. Defense is calculated as one

minus the accuracy of opponent head strikes. The same goes for the “Chin” calculation, which is one

minus the Knockdown Rate of opponents for a certain fighter. Generally, you should see good fighters

showing better accuracy and power than their opponents while fighters with poor accuracy and low

defense probably won’t last long in the UFC.

The last striking metrics show Significant Strikes Attempted per Minute and the overall

Significant Strike Accuracy. This metric was detailed in Chapter 3 and is an aggregated metric for

strikes that are potentially important in a fight, rather than just superficial. While it’s true that great

strikers will tend to have a good Significant Strike Accuracy, that number can be heavily influenced

by how much time the fighter spends in positions with higher success rates for strikes, or for fighters

who mix in a lot of body and leg strikes, which have higher accuracy than head strikes alone. The

average for the UFC is 6.8 attempts per minute with a success rate of 41%. Generally, I look at pace

more than accuracy to find high output fighters, but because accuracy is often quoted in UFC

broadcasts I keep it on the Uber Tape for reference.



It was clear when looking at this matchup that McDonald (on the left) has some advantages in the

standup game over Pickett (on the right). Most importantly, McDonald’s Knockdown Rate is over

three times the Bantamweight average. Combined with Pickett’s suspect chin, McDonald went on to



score two different knockdowns in the first round of this fight. The one metric that favored Pickett

was still revealing in this instance. His high average rate of Significant Strikes Attempted per minute

indicated he is a fighter who likes to press the action. And despite being on the losing end of most

exchanges, Pickett fought with admirable bravery and a frenetic pace, which helped earn both fighters

the Fight of the Night Bonus. Remember the rule about the Pace Advantage: having high pace is good,

but having low pace is terrible. In this matchup Pickett did have the higher pace, but McDonald was

safely in the middle group in terms of his own pace, and so was not at too much risk.

The last category on the Uber Tape encompasses a lot of variables that are key parts of the

Ground Game. The first area is takedowns. The Takedown Attempt rate shows how often a fighter

attempts takedowns, while the success rate indicates how often they achieve them. That’s fairly

straightforward. In the UFC the average number of takedowns attempted by a fighter per five-minute

round is 1.5, with an overall success rate of 40%. Looking at the Uber Tape can tell us which fighter

is more likely to try to get the fight to the ground, and also who is more likely to succeed.

Below that, Takedown Defense is calculated as one minus the success rate for opponent

takedowns, or the percentage that a fighter has successfully defended when facing takedowns. Great

wrestlers don’t always have high offensive takedown success rates due to the frequency with which

they make attempts and the fact that their opponents are expecting them. But the best wrestlers in

MMA often show very high Takedown Success values. Because the average success rate for

takedowns is 40%, that means 60% is the UFC benchmark for takedown defense. The other metric

shows how many actual takedowns a fighter has faced inside the Octagon to give some level of

fidelity to their takedown metric. Seeing a Defense metric of 100% is less meaningful if they’ve only

faced two takedowns. That’s like saying a pitcher is undefeated after only one win. Similarly,

seasoned veterans may learn from experience and improve their defense over time.

Second from the bottom is a critical metric for understanding the grappling tendencies of a fighter:

the Share of Ground Time in Control. Using the Time In Position (TIP) data from FightMetric, I rolled

up aggregated data for every UFC fighter and calculated what percentage of time spent on the ground

was in a position of dominance. The UFC average must be 50%, so any fighter above that threshold

has been more likely than not to be in ground control. That leads to the final metric, Submission

Attempts per Trip to Ground. I know, I know, fighters can attempt submissions while standing too, but

most either occur on the ground, or lead to a grounded position eventually. The alternative metric was

submission attempts per minute of fight time, but the value would be skewed by how much time was

spent in various positions. Many fights don’t see any submission attempts because the two fighters

stand and trade for the entire three rounds. Generally, active submission artists will show up either

way and so I’ve included the metric regardless of its imperfection, and in this particular matchup, the

metric still proved to be prophetic.



Despite Pickett’s higher pace of takedown attempts, McDonald was evenly matched with slightly



better than average takedown defense, and good offense of his own. One differentiator was the ground

control stat, which suggested Pickett was much more likely to end up in top control and work from the

top. On the flipside, it was McDonald who was more than twice as likely to attempt a submission if

they ended up on the ground. After dominating the standup game McDonald did end up on his back,

but then used the position to sink in a triangle choke that ended the fight in the second round and

earned him a Submission of the Night bonus.

The betting lines at 5Dimes.com opened at -215 for McDonald, making him a clear, but not huge

favorite in the matchup. By the time the fight began the market had pushed the moneyline odds to -320,

boosting his implied win probability from 68% to 76%. The market had the right hunch in this case,

but understanding the big advantages that McDonald had in the fight would have presented a lot of

value for bettors when the moneyline was released, and in my opinion even on fight night.

And that’s the Uber Tale of the Tape. In this case, my Uber Tape revealed overall anthropometric

and performance metric advantages in the McDonald-Pickett matchup, enough to prompt me to write a

short matchup analysis and prediction of McDonald winning inside the distance, all the way down to

foreseeing a Fight of the Night bonus (cha-ching). The “Tale” isn’t always so compelling a story.

Often fighters are very evenly matched, or advantages for one are offset by advantages of the other.

Such is the nature of a competitive environment. Even in this case, despite the seemingly lopsided

nature of the matchup, Pickett was by no means out of the fight. Any fighter worth a roster spot in the

UFC is a highly trained athlete capable of hurting his or her opponent in a flash. That’s why we watch

– anything can happen on any given fight night.



There’s No Such thing as a Fair Fight

Contrary to popular belief, stars don’t align, but the stats sometimes do. Watch out for Uber Tape

on high profile matchups when they are announced and again leading up to the fight. From these

numbers, we can usually glean a few hints as to who might have the advantage, and how the fight

might play out. There’s no such thing as a fair fight, because no two fighters are identical in their

genetic and experiential profiles. Understanding the particulars of how each fighter is different makes

the contest more interesting by spotlighting likely battlegrounds within the fight itself. They can also

be used to understand the context of who should be favored, and therefore also better appreciate

surprising performances.

As technology and time progress, the metrics we analyze will evolve much like the sport itself,

and we can look deeper into each matchup to better understand fighters and the sport. As with many

other places in this book, I expect that this section too will become outdated. I won’t be sad; progress

is a good thing. Soon enough prefight analysis for blockbuster MMA matchups will include

information that fight fans of yesteryear never dreamed of. Analysis of MMA statistics will provide

increasingly valuable insight into how fights go down and what fans should be watching for as they

do. Understanding any given subject matter only makes the appreciation of it more fulfilling. With

each landed jab, arm bar attempt, or slam on a shooting takedown, spectators should appreciate the

subtle and skillful demonstrations that occur each second in the cage, because during any of those

seconds anyone can win.



15



The Future of MMA: The Last & Greatest Combat

Sport

MMA Killed the Kung Fu Star

Martial Arts have frequently been caricatured on movie screens and mass manufactured in

McDojos across every town, both by the purists who wish to preserve them and the profiteers who

know a good cash cow when they see one. As recently as 20 years ago martial arts still carried the

mystique of harboring a magical Secret, the kind you might find in a book recommended by Oprah

Winfrey. Practitioners of every combat art discipline were confident that their traditions and skills

were the best and everyone else’s was inferior. There were “five-fingered death punches,” no-touch

knockouts, Chi-anchoring, Tiger paw backflips, cobra strikes, crane kicks, and the belief that one

fast-moving striker could defeat an army of combat-trained fighters. It wasn’t just the stuff of legend,

it fueled the dreams of every 10-year old kid bursting with energy and aspirations of heroism. As one

of those kids in the late-1980’s I probably rented every VHS tape available with the word “ninja” in

it, succumbing to the allure of martial arts legends portrayed by Sonny Chiba and Bruce Lee. It didn’t

take long for fans like me to yearn to see martial arts masters leap from the movie screen to the sports

arena, any arena, for a chance to see their lightning-fast strikes and acrobatic feats of violence destroy

evil doers “for real.”

But a funny thing happened on the way to the pay-per-view market: a science experiment. The

promoters and participants of the first Ultimate Fighting Championships conducted an experiment so

simple I would call it “elegant” if I didn’t worry it might cause John McCain to risk a myocardial

infarction. The science that occurred on November 12th, 1993 in front of 2,800 live guests and

approximately 86,000 pay-per-view households was not lost on many. A lanky, awkward Brazilian

guy worked his way through a field of highly trained (and far more intimidating) fighters, forcing his

will on all three and manipulating them into excruciating submissions in a grand total of five minutes

and one second of fight time. It should have taken even less time, honestly, as referee Joao Alberto

Barreto failed to save several of Gracie’s opponents in a timely manner. Strikes landed with dull

thuds instead of theatrical slaps. Contests were bloody, sweaty, body-on-body confrontations that

contained none of the crisp and decisive striking combinations of movie kung fu artists. It was gritty,

it was in your face, and it was the realest fighting most people had ever seen.

The stunned audience, dressed in Saturday night’s best instead of white lab coats, was able to

observe science in action and reach a collective conclusion. Brazilian Jiu Jitsu made a claim about

being the best hand-to-hand combat system on Earth and on that night, under those circumstances, the

hypothesis could not be rejected. Don’t let the sciency subtlety of that statement misrepresent the

awesomeness of what transpired. It was a historic chapter in the world of sports and competition.

There were probably high fives among all the BJJ and grappling aficionados while the fans of the

other martial arts and plenty of casual observers were stunned into disbelief. The cage proved to be a

brutally honest test-tube for fighting, unforgiving of hype or arrogance, “Qi” or tradition.

Effectiveness ruled and there could be only one winner. With one painful surrender after another, the

Gracies killed the mystique of the kung fu star.



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