2 The Response of the Heads of Missions of France, Belgium and the United States to the Fax of Dallaire

Negative Response on the Deteriorating Situation



109



sion to make an immediate demarche to the President and ended his fax with

a request for instructions. 10 The same day, the Belgian Ministry of Foreign

Affairs gave permission to make a demarche to President Habyarimana together

with their French and American colleagues. II

As scheduled, on January 14 the three ambassadors met with President

Habyarimana. This meeting was initially planned to temper the objections against

the installation of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and to

express concern about the implementation of the Arusha Accords. I2 Now it

could be used to make a demarche to the President. Judging by the Belgian

telex-communication, however, it becomes clear that the demarche made was

very weak. 13 The ambassadors did not discuss the information from Jean Pierre

explicitly, and the plan to wound and kill the Belgian peace-keepers was only

mentioned in a very indirect way. 14 Reporting upon the meeting, Swinnen wrote

to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Our statement regarding the security was repetitive and strong[ly] underlined."15 Subsequently he asked whether

a specific demarche was still necessary. He stated: "Regarding the strong emphasis that [in the meeting with the President] was put on the security aspects (the

activities of the Interahamwe and the weapon distribution) the question arises

whether a specific demarche, especially because Habyarimana showed understanding, [is still necessary]." Swinnen added that Paris had reacted "restrictively" towards the idea of a specific demarche. 16 The next day, January 15,

Swinnen informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the three ambassadors



10

Telex No. 32, January 13, 1994, of the Belgian embassy Kigali to the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 27.

11

Annex Belgian Senate, p. 29.

12

Telex No. 41 , January 14, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28.

13

Telex No. 41 , January 14, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28; Belgian Ad Hoc

Group, p. 41; United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, p. 32 (1996)

(hereinafter U.N., the United Nations and Rwanda).

14

Telex No. 41 , January 14, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28. According to Des

Forges, the ambassadors did not say anything specific about the information of Jean

Pierre in their meeting with the President because the "French opposed doing so." See

Des Forges, p. 154, note 49: According to the report of the French National Assembly,

the three diplomats made a demarche to Habyarimana "in the same sense"-but not

identical to-that of the U.N. representatives (Booh Booh and Dallaire). Assemblee

Nationale, Mission d'information commune, Enquete, Tome I, Rapport, p. 203.

15

Telex No. 41 , January 14, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28; Belgian Ad Hoc

Group, p. 41; U.N., The United Nations and Rwanda, p. 32.

16

Telex No. 41 , January 14, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28.



110



The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda



of France, the United States and Belgium had decided not to make another

demarche to the President but that they would follow the information of Jean

Pierre very closely.I7 In the same fax Swinnen pointed once again to the possibility that President Habyarimana "as many assert" was in control of what is

called "a Machiavelli Plan."18 In another fax of January 15 the Belgian embassy

wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels that: "UNAMIR has sufficient proved information now regarding the existence of at least four weapon

depots. The most important 'cache' is the headquarters of MRND in the

Kimihurura area. The informant showed several dozen weapons to an African

UNAMIR officer who was especially appointed by Dallaire to accompany the

informant." The fax stated that "according to the informant the destabilization

plan is very well organized, the Interahamwe operates throughout numerous

cells and have been ordered to localize the Tutsi." The fax continues by saying

that UNAMIR is inclined to conduct investigation operations as soon as possible, "because it knows that the weapons will disappear in the coming days in

the direction of the Interahamwe and the civilian population." The fax mentioned that New York decided to postpone the dismantling of weapons, which

meant that the distribution would continue in the coming days "with all risks

that are attached to this regarding the destabilization of the country."19

We may conclude that it is highly remarkable that the three ambassadors,

who were asked by Booh Booh and Dallaire to make a demarche to President

Habyarimana, made just this weak demarche during a scheduled meeting. The

inactivity in the follow-up of Jean Pierre's story was considered to be especially

striking for ambassador Swinnen. First of all, it was Belgian peace-keepers that

according to Jean Pierre were to be wounded or killed as part of a plan. Secondly,

the Belgian ambassador seemed to be very aware of the dangerous situation.

As seen above, he wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Jean Pierre's

story was a "confirmation of what was already expected" and that this information "could not be ignored."20 Thirdly, in the same fax as that in which

Swinnen informed his Ministry that no specific demarche would be made, he

wrote that Habyarimana was said to be in control of the so-called "Machiavelli

Plan." Lastly, Swinnen was not hindered by his Ministry of Foreign Affairs; he

had received permission to make a demarche. 21

Swinnen's notion of the dangerous situation and the possibility of the

involvement of Habyarimana were at odds with the decision not to make a spe17

Telex No. 44, January 15, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28.

18

See Section 7.2 for the "Machiavelli Plan."

19

See Telex No. 45, January 15, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, pp. 28-29. See also

Section 11.2.

20

Telex No. 32, January 13, 1994, of the Belgian embassy Kigali to the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28.

21

Annex Belgian Senate, p. 29.



Negative Response on the Deteriorating Situation



111



cific demarche. An explanation lies most likely in the French rejection of a firm

response towards Habyarimana. According to Des Forges, it was due to French

opposition that the three ambassadors did not say anything specific about the

information of Jean Pierre in their meeting with the President. 22 According to

Swinnen, it was France which had reacted "restrictively" towards the idea of a

specific demarche. 23



9.3 JEAN PIERRE PROVES HIS STORY BUT IS DENIED ASYLUM

As stated above, the ambassadors had refused to give Jean Pierre and his

family sanctuary.24 In the name of Dallaire, Marchal repeated the request to

ambassador Swinnen, but the official reaction of Belgium was that no asylum

could be allowed, in order to remain neutral.25 In response to the refusal, Swinnen

sent a fax to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels in which he suggested

an investigation into whether Jean Pierre could be taken by a U.N. service into

Tanzania or Kenia. 26 Whether a response to this suggestion was ever received

is unknown.

In the meantime, Marchal had his second meeting with Jean Pierre. Marchal

told him that proof was needed to sustain his story. That same day, Jean Pierre

showed the Senegalese Captain Deme an arms cache in the basement of the

MRND headquarters. Jean Pierre, who told the guards at the MRND headquarters that his companion was an African friend, had no problems showing

Deme around. Afterwards Jean Pierre escorted Captain Claes and Captain Deme

throughout the city for two hours, in which he identified more weapons depots.

At the end of the meeting, Jean Pierre urged UNAMIR to take prompt action,

because the weapons would soon be distributed. With this new information

Dallaire hoped to convince New York that action was needed, but headquarters

did not change its opinion. 27 A few days later, Jean Pierre told Captain Claes

that the weapons had indeed been distributed.

Now that the weapons had been spread amongst the people, and Jean Pierre

was unable to get asylum, Marchal realized that further contact with Jean Pierre



Des Forges p. 154.

See Telex No. 41, January 14, 1994, of the Belgian embassy in Kigali to the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brussels; Annex Belgian Senate, p. 28.

24

Dallaire, p. 148.

25

Interview with L. Marchal, January 21, 2005.

26

Annex Belgian Senate, p. 77; Telex No. 45, January 15, 1994, of the Belgian

Embassy in Kigali to the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

27

Luc Marchal, Aan de poorten van de Rwandese hel: Getuigenis van een peacekeeper, p. 139 (2001) (hereinafter Marchal); Des Forges, p. 153, note 46: Service de

Police Judiciaire aupres de la Justice Militaire, En cause de Dewez Joseph et Marchal

Luc, Annexe A/6 au PV No. 1210 du 6/11/95.

22

23



The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda



112



was pointless. 28 He could not offer him any guarantees, and the official contact with Jean Pierre was therefore ended. Throughout January UNAMIR did

stay in sporadic contact with Jean Pierre, but at the end of the month Jean Pierre

broke all communication. 29 Jean Pierre disappeared at the end of January, and

up to this day it is not clear what happened to him, although Rawson was of

the opinion that he finally got out of the country to Kenya. 30 Claes also holds

the opinion that he was moved from Rwanda to another African country.31



Marchal, pp. 140, 141.

Dallaire writes in his book that thanks to Jean Pierre UNAMIR had "all the

information to confirm that a well-organized conspiracy consisted in the country to

destroy the Arusha Accords, by all means necessary." Dallaire pp. 150-151.

30

Interview D. Rawson, May 26, 2005.

31

Interview W Claes, January 13, 2006.

28



29



CHAPTER 10

DETERIORATING SECURITY IN RWANDA AND

THE NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM NEW YORK

FROM JANUARY UP UNTIL MARCH



10.1



POLITICAL DEADLOCK IN THE A RUSHA PEACE

AGREEMENTS



The installation of the transitional government was originally planned for

December 31,1993, but the ceremony did not take place. The installation was

postponed and would be postponed another five times. Eventually the government would not be installed before the outbreak of the genocide.

On December 31 the installment was postponed to January 5,1994. On

January 5 only President Habyarimana was sworn in.! Due to a lack of consensus on the appointment of the ministers, the installment of the rest of the

cabinet was postponed until February 14. By that date, the installment was postponed again to February 23, then to March 25, then to March 28 and finally to

the beginning of April. 2

Discussing the political deadlock in his second progress report of March

30, the U.N. Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, argued that during the previous months, his Special Representative Booh Booh (SRSG) had expressed his



The difficulties existed especially within the Liberal Party (PL) and the

Mouvement Democratique Republicain (MRD) regarding the lists of their representatives to serve as ministers in the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and as

deputies in the Transitional National Assembly. Furthermore, Habyarimana, supported

by the Hutu hardliners of the MRD and the PL, launched several challenges to the interpretation of the Accords. One of the challenges was the proposal to give the Coalition

pour Defense de la Republique (CDR) a seat in the transitional government. For more

information, see Filip Reyntjens, L'Afrique des Grands Lacs, en crise: Rwanda, Burundi:

1988-1994, pp. 17-18 (1994) (hereinafter Reyntjens); Alison Des Forges, Leave None

to Tell the Story, Genocide in Rwanda (1999) (hereinafter Des Forges); Gerard Prunier,

The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (1959-1994), p. 204 (1995) (hereinafter

Prunier); Frontline interview with Beardsley, November IS, 2003.

2

Repeated here from Section 7.5.



113



The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda



114



concern over the delay in the installment of the various political leaders. BoutrosGhali further stated that Booh Booh had urged Habyarimana and other leaders

continuously to "expedite action for the establishment of the transitional government." The Secretary-General argued furthermore that he himself spoke to

Habyarimana on a number of occasions by telephone and that he had written

him to convey his strong expectations, as well as the international community's

expectations, that the transitional government should be promptly established. 3

This research will disclose that in the contacts between the SecretaryGeneral with both the SRSG and President Habyarimana about the political

deadlock and the failure to install the government, Boutros-Ghali's response

consisted mainly of a threat to withdraw UNAMIR when no improvement was

seen. This was exactly what the extremists wanted to hear.

In this chapter we will substantiate this observation with an explanation of

the events in Rwanda and the subsequent reactions of U.N. headquarters in New

York during the months of January, February and March 1994.



10.2



JANUARY 1994



In the second half of January, the security situation deteriorated rapidly.

More violent demonstrations took place, and armed mobs started to riot in the

streets of Kigali.

On January 14 Booh Booh informed Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali by

telephone that the two parties in Rwanda had so far failed to respect the agreement to establish the transitional government. Booh Booh stated that he was

trying to find a solution together with the ambassadors of France, Belgium, the

United States and Tanzania. Boutros-Ghali asked Booh Booh to meet

Habyarimana to express his concern about the situation and to explain that each

day of delay might cost the United Nations many thousands of dollars, because

the troops would be obliged to remain available for a long time and that for this

reason delays would cause problems with the Security Counci1. 4 Whether or

not Booh Booh delivered this message to Habyarimana is unknown to the authors.

However, when the Secretary-General received a phone call from

Habyarimana that very same day, he got the opportunity to speak to the President

himself. The file of the telephone conversation states that:



U.N. Doc. S/1994/360, Second progress report of the Secretary-General on

UNAMIR for the period from December 30, 1993, to March 30, 1994, paragraph 8, p.

2 (hereinafter S/1994/360).

4

United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the

United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, December 15, 1999, Ingvar

Carlsson, Han, Sung-loo, Rufus, M. Kupolati, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257, pp. 12, 13 (hereinafter Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257).



Deteriorating Security and the Negative Response from New York



115



The Secretary General assured the President that the U.N. trusted his

leadership and asked him to do his best to resolve the problem. The

Secretary General argued that unless there was progress the U.N. would

be obliged to withdraw its presence. The President responded that this

would be a disaster for his country. He promised that he would do his

best and that he would meet the ambassadors again the following week. 5

By telling Habyarimana bluntly that if there was no progress, UNAMIR would

have to withdraw itself, Boutros-Ghali was probably giving the extremists the

response that they had hoped for.

On January 16 some 5,000 MRND supporters came together at the

Nyamirambo stadium. It was a calm demonstration that passed without incident. However, as UNAMIR discovered a few days later, the meeting had been

used to distribute weapons amongst the people. One of the people that gave a

speech during the gathering was Justin Mugenzi, leader of the Hutu Power

Section of the Liberal Party. In his speech, Mugenzi referred to the ethnic divisions in Rwanda. 6 It was only a few days later that assassins tried to kill him. 7

On January 21 a crowd, armed with machetes, gathered in front of the

Conseil National de Developpement (CND) building and was yelling at the

RPF guards. Brent Beardsley, Canadian Military Assistant to General Romeo

Dallaire, who realized that the situation could easily escalate, decided to intervene. He ordered the RPF not to respond to the provocation and to stay in their

compound. Together with Dallaire's personal driver, Master Corporal Troute,

Beardsley went into the crowd. At the center of the mob they found a man and

a pregnant woman on the ground, both heavily wounded by the crowd. By threatening with their rifles, Beardsley and Troute were able to get the two civilians

into safety.8 This kind of violence in which innocent Tutsi civilians were attacked

had rarely been seen up to this point, but it would soon become a common scene

in the streets of Kigali.

The next day, machete and club-carrying youth had blocked all major intersections in Kigali. 9 The situation developed into a violent demonstration.



Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257, pp. 12, 13.

Des Forges states in her book that Justin Mugenzi, president of the PL, "played

on" the ethnic divisions, but the authors do not know what the exact background of this

statement was. Des Forges, p. 155.

7

Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide,

p. 96 (2000) (hereinafter Melvern, 2000); Des Forges, p. 155, note 55: Marchal,

"Considerations relatives," p. 14; Annexe Al7 au PV no. 1210 du 6/11/95 du Service de

Police Judiciaire aupres de la Justice Militaire; Des Forges, p. 156, note 59: Anonymous,

"Rwanda, Chronology." Who the assassins that tried to kill him were is unknown.

8

Romeo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, The Failure of Humanity in

Rwanda, pp. 157-158 (2004) (hereinafter Dallaire).

9

Id., pp. 159, 160; Melvern, 2000 p. 96.



116



The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda



UNAMIR decided to leave the situation up to the gendarmerie. It turned out to

be a wise decision: Jean Pierre told Captain Frank Claeys that this demonstration had been another attempt by the extremists to entice the Belgian peacekeepers to use force. IO As a result of this demonstration, Dallaire asked

headquarters for a broader mandate on January 22. 11 Whether U.N. headquarters responded to Dallaire's request is unknown.

On January 24 Booh Booh complained to the press that weapons were being

distributed from arms caches around Kigali and even inside the town. I2 On

January 27 Boutros-Ghali wrote to Habyarimana to convey his strong expectations, as well as the international community's expectations, that the transitional government was going to be promptly established. 13

Approaching the end of the month, the violence in Kigali increased. 14

Machete-carrying mobs attacking Tutsi started to turn up all over the city. 15 The

Interahamwe rioted in the streets.I 6 Major Frank Kamenzi, the RPF liaison officer to UNAMIR, was attacked with a grenade. Another grenade was thrown

into UNAMIR's headquarters. Luckily there were no casualties. More grenades

were thrown at the CND building. 17 According to Luc Marchal, January was a

period of intimidation, theft, aggression, violence and murder. 18



10

Dallaire, pp. 159-161. Dallaire gives a lengthy description of the demonstration on January 22 and does not speak of a demonstration on January 23. Melvern, on

the other hand, speaks of a demonstration on the 23rd during which 47 people were

killed. Melvern does not speak of a demonstration on January 22. Therefore, it may be

that they are, in fact, speaking of the same demonstration. Melvern, 2000 p. 96; Dallaire,

pp. 159-161.

11

Des Forges, part warnings. note 62: Anonymous, "Rwanda, Chronology."

According to Melvern, Dallaire's request was made one day later, on January 23. Melvern,

2000 p. 96.

12

Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, Early warning and conflict management

genocide in Rwanda, p. 28 (1995).

13

S/1994/360, paragraph 8, p. 2.

14

Luc Marchal, Aan de poorten van de Rwandese hel: Getuigenis van een peacekeeper pp. 151, 152 (2001) (hereinafter Marchal).

15

Dallaire, pp. 158, 159.

16

Des Forges, p. 157, note 65: Anonymous, "Rwanda, Chronology."

17

Marchal, pp. 151, 152; Des Forges, p. 158, note 69: Anonymous, "Rwanda,

Chronology."

18

Marchal, pp. 150-152. On February 3 officers of the general staff in Evere

(Operation Center of the Belgian Army) informed the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

that they suspected the grenade attacks in Kigali to be the result of "an organized plan."

Senat de Belgique, Rapport du Groupe Ad Hoc Rwanda A La Commission des Affairs

Etrangeres, Senat de Belgique, 7 janvier 1997, p. 71 (hereinafter Belgian Ad Hoc Group).

How many people were wounded or killed throughout the month of January is unknown.



Deteriorating Security and the Negative Response from New York



117



This critical security situation caused Booh Booh and Dallaire to send a

cable to Kofi Annan in New York on February 3. 19 They wrote that the security

situation was deteriorating on a daily basis. The fax stated:

Increasingly violent demonstrations, nightly grenade attacks, assassination attempts, political and ethnic killings, and we are receiving more

and more reliable and confirmed information that the armed militias

of the parties are stockpiling and may possibly be preparing to distribute arms to their supporters. If this distribution takes place, it will

worsen the security situation even further and create a significant danger to the safety and security of U.N. military and civilian personnel

and the population at large. 2o

According to the Carlsson Report, by sending this fax, "UNAMIR sought the

guidance and approval of headquarters to commence deterrent operations."21

Following this request, Dallaire's mandate was broadened a little. Dallaire got

permission to assist the Rwandan authorities in recovering weapons, but he did

not get the authorization to conduct such operations alone. U.N. headquarters

stated: "UNAMIR's role ... should be limited to a monitoring function."22



10.3



FEBRUARY 1994



In the first two weeks of February, the security situation was relatively

quiet. The date for the installment of the government was getting closer, and



19

According to the Carlsson Report, Booh Booh sent the fax on February 2.

According to Dallaire, he sent the fax on February 3. The text ofBooh Booh's fax, which

as cited in the Carlsson Report, contains the same elements as the text of Dallaire's fax

cited in his book. In Dallaire's book, it is said that Booh Booh responded positively to

his fax and that Booh Booh sent the fax to New York. Des Forges and Melvern speak

of a fax from Dallaire on February 3 in which the same information is also cited. For

this reason, it is assumed that the two faxes (Booh Booh's fax of February 2, which is

cited in the Independent Inquiry, and Dallaire's fax of February 3 are the same). It seems

that Dallaire wrote the fax that was sent by and with the approval ofBooh Booh to New

York. The text of this footnote is also in Section 11.1.

20

Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257, p. 13. According to Carlsson, Booh Booh sent

this report on February 2, and according to Melvern, Dallaire sent this report on the 3rd.

See Melvern, 2000 p. 99; see Section 11.1.

21

Carlsson Report, S/1999/1257, p. 13.

22

Dallaire states in his book that he received an answer from headquarters, but

he does not give a specific date when he received this answer. It seems that he received

the response fairly quickly, on February 3 or 4. Dallaire, pp. 167; Des Forges, note 82:

Anonymous, "Rwanda, Chronology." See more in Section 11.1.



The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda



118



renewed attention was paid to the political situation. 23 Political negotiations

took place in several so-called "all-party meetings." These meetings were organized by Booh Booh and took place at the UNAMIR headquarters in Kigali. 24

The meetings aimed at getting a consensus of the representatives of different

parties within the transitional institutions. 25 At the last "all-party meeting"

before the planned ceremony on February 14 the MRND suddenly did not turn

up, and no final decision could be made on the different ministerial postS. 26 At

the swearing-in the following day-February IS-none of the parties was present. On February 15 UNAMIR continued to express concern about the security situation in a meeting with ambassadors in Kigali from Belgium, France,

Germany and the United States. 27

In mid-February the Security Council gave a presidential statement about

the deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. The Security Council reminded

parties of their obligation to respect the Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA)

agreement. 28 The Council's statement was handed over to Habyarimana February

19, which would be the last day before grave violence erupted again. 29 The week

of February 20-26 would become the most violent week in the approach to the

genocide, characterized by many political murders.

On February 20 the MRD held a meeting at the Nyamirambo stadium.

When the gathering began, the Interahamwe had surrounded the building, making it almost impossible for the MRD to get to the stadium. As soon as Prime

Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana, member of the MRD, arrived, the crowd

started throwing stones. Belgian peace-keepers escorting Madame Agathe had

to fire 63 shots in the air in order to free themselves. 30 The gendarmerie was

finally able to get the situation under control, but not before at least five people had been killed. 31 That night, assailants tried to kill Prime Minister-desig-



23

24



The newly set date for the installment of the government was February 14.

The meetings took place on February 7, 10 and 13. 8/1994/360, paragraph 12,



p.3.

According to Marchal, the date was set for February 15. Dallaire, p. 178.

The idea was raised to swear-in those ministers upon whom everyone had

decided. The newly installed government would then be able to decide upon these last

positions that were left unfulfilled. This way, the PL would have more time to resolve

its internal problems and to join those institutions later. However, the PL and the MDR

did not want to go ahead with this idea. They argued that all outstanding problems should

first be resolved before proceeding to set up the BBTG; see 8/1994/360, paragraph 12,

p. 3 and Dallaire, pp. 178, 179.

27

Carlsson Report, 8/1999/1257, p. 13.

28

The statement was made on February 17. Presidential 8tatement

8/PR8T/1994/8; Carlsson Report, 8/1999/1257, p. 14.

29

Carlsson Report, 8/1999/1257, p. 14.

30

Belgian Ad Hoc Group, p. 38; Dallaire, p. 186.

31

Marchal, p. 156.

25



26



Deteriorating Security and the Negative Response from New York



119



nate Faustin Twagiramungu, member of the MRD. Twagimurungu was able to

escape, but one of his bodyguards was killed in the attack. 32

The following day, February 21, the CDR organized a demonstration. Hutu

extremists blocked the center of Kigali, and CDR demonstrators burst into

Madame Agathe's office, where they took several hostages. After a few hours

of negotiating, UNAMIR and the gendarmerie were able to release them. 33 That

evening, the Minister of Public Affairs, Felicien Gatabazi, who was head of the

PSD party and a prominent Hutu moderate, was shot dead. The media of the

extremists reacted by "spinning headlines in which the killing of Gatabazi was

celebrated as a victory."34

On February 23 extremists and moderates alike went out into the streets. 35

In Kigali, UNAMIR and the gendarmerie were able to keep the situation under

control. In Gatabazi's home town, Butare, however, very violent demonstrations took place. In this violence, PSD supporters killed the head of the extremist party CDR, Martin Bucyana. 36 This resurgence of violence, in which two

prominent political leaders, Felicien Gatabazi and Martin Bucyana, were murdered, worsened the overall political climate. 37 We must remind ourselves here

of the letter that Dallaire had received from high-ranking military officers

December 3. 38 The letter spoke of a "Machiavelli plan" and predicted the killing

of both Twagiramungu and Gatabazi. By now, Twagimarungu had been the victim of an attempted murder and Gatabazi had been killed. The installation of

the interim government was planned to take place February 23, the day after

Gatabazi's death. Due to a sudden outbreak of violence in Kigali, the installation was postponed. 39

In the face of the deteriorating political and security situation, the SecretaryGeneral called President Habyarimana on February 24. Boutros-Ghali stressed

the need for urgent action to end the political stalemate and to proceed with the

establishment of the transitional institutions. Furthermore, he warned the

President that the "international community" would not take responsibility if

the situation were to explode. 40 A few days later, Boutros-Ghali received a special envoy of Habyarimana, the Minister for Transport and Communications.

Dallaire, p. 187.

Dallaire, pp. 187, 188; Marchal, p. 156.

34

Daillaire, p. 188.

35

Id.

36

Melvern, 2000 p. 100.

37

S/1994/360, paragraph 13, p. 3.

38

See Section 7.2.

39

See Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations

Assistance Mission in Rwanda which states that during negotiations that took place on

the 16th and the 18th an agreement was reached to postpone the installment to February

23. S/1994/360.

40

United Nations, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996 p. 34 (1996)

(hereinafter U.N., The United Nations and Rwanda); S/1994/360, paragraph 14, p. 4.

32

33