Facilities, Fixed, and Movable Equipment

which must be met. OSHA standards, where applicable 1, are consistent in every state, but

building codes vary from locality to locality, often depending upon interpretations of a local

code official. The requirements for access for the disabled under the ADA clearly affect

emergency movements. A s a result, fire alarms now require intense strobe lighting devices as

well as audible signals. Braille instructions may be required for the blind in parts of a facility.

Special chairs may have to be provided for the physically disabled. Places of refuge to which

disabled persons can go while awaiting help must be identified. For several other types of risk,

special regulations, such as the classification system for recombinant DNA research facilities,

also have safety restrictions that must be included in the building design. This latter set of

safety restrictions will be reserved to later chapters dealing with these special topics.

Concerns which should be addressed in the designs of laboratory buildings to enhance

emergency responses depend upon the classification. For example, if the building is a hazardous

u s e occupancy, most codes will require a sprinkler or other fire suppression systems. If a

sprinkler or alarm system is required by a local fire code, then OSHA 1910.37(m&n) requires

maintenance and testing. Also for this classification, OSHA will require under 1910.37(f)(2) that

the doors swing in the direction of exit travel, yet most building codes have restrictions on doors

swinging into corridors to avoid creating obstructions to corridor traffic. In order to satisfy both

requirements, doors should be recessed into alcoves inside the laboratory. Even existing

facilities may have to be upgraded to meet some code standards.

The size of a building, the number of floors, and the relationship to other structures all enter

code decisions affecting safety in emergencies. Addition of equipment to a laboratory, such as

a hood, can have serious fire safety implications. Is there adequate makeup air? If not, where can

it be obtained? Halls cannot not be used as a plenum or as a supply of makeup air for more than

a few hundred ft 3 per minute (cfm) for each laboratory space. Even a small, 4-foot fume hood

discharges about 800 cfm, so that one cannot draw the required makeup air in through louvers

in the door. Usually, one must go outside for a source of makeup air, but what is the relation of

this new inlet air intake to the exhaust system? Toxic fumes could be drawn back into a building.

A fume exhaust duct penetrating a floor could allow a fire to spread from one floor to another.

Therefore, most codes require fume hood ducts to be enclosed in a fire-rated chase. Because of

the expense of constructing a chase, the cost of avoiding worsening the fire separation in a

building could preclude installation of the hood, which in turn could preclude using the space

for the intended research. One option, to allow future flexibility, is to incorporate external chases

as an architectural feature in the design. Energy loss considerations can impact the design of a

laboratory. Auxiliary air hoods have been used in the past to reduce the amount of tempered air

being “wasted,” but there are a number of reasons why this type of hood is less desirable and

they are seldom used any more in new construction. In fact, most laboratory designers explicitly

prohibit the u s e of auxiliary air hoods. An alternative is to design a ventilation system for a

laboratory to maintain a constant volume of air through a hood while in use, and provide some

means of reducing the ventilation requirements for a facility when the hood is not being used.

Ventilation will be discussed in much more detail in Chapter III.

The interior arrangements of a laboratory are critical in permitting safe evacuation from the

laboratory. The types of accidents listed earlier could p o s e much more serious risks to

individuals should they occur between an individual and the exit from the room. A simple

solution for these potential emergencies for larger laboratories is to have two well-separated

exits. This is not always possible, especially in smaller laboratories. An alternative would be to

evaluate what components of a laboratory are most likely to be involved in an incident and

which would increase the hazard if they became involved in an ongoing emergency. These

components should be located so that an escape route from the normal work area does not pass

by them. Also, portable fire extinguishers, fire blankets, respirators, and other emergency

equipment should be located on this same escape route. Eyewash stations and deluge showers



*



About 25 states have adopted their own state OSHA plans which are required to be as stringent as the federal

standards; however, public employees in some of these states may not be covered by the OSHA standards.



©2000 CRC Press LLC



should be located close to where injuries are likely to occur, so an individual will not have to

move substantial distances while in intense pain or blinded. Aisles should be wide (typically a

minimum of 42 to 48 inches), straight, and uncluttered with excess equipment to ease movement

in emergencies. A laboratory should have emergency lighting, but many do not. The

considerable dangers posed to an individual stumbling around in a pitch dark laboratory should

the power fail are obvious. Inexpensive, battery-powered rechargeable units are a potential

solution here and are not expensive, even in retrofitting a facility.

Many regulations found in OSHA standards include features that will minimize the scope

and impact of an emergency such as a fire. For example, restrictions in 1910.106 on container

sizes of flammable liquids and the amounts of these materials that are permitted to be stored

outside flammable material storage cabinets are designed to limit the amount of fuel available to

a fire and to extend the time before the material could become involved.

Every action should be considered in terms of what would result if the worst happened. In

large projects, this is often part of a formal hazard analysis, but this concept should be extended

to virtually every decision within a laboratory. For example, a common piece of equipment found

in most laboratories is a refrigerator. A refrigeration unit suitable for storing flammables, i.e.,

containing no internal sources of ignition, costs about two to three times as much as a similar

unit designed for home use. It is tempting, especially if money is tight and the immediate need

does not require storage of flammables, to save the difference. However, the average lifetime of

a refrigeration unit is roughly 15 to 20 years. W h o can say what materials research programs will

entail over such a long period? If flammable vapors within an ordinary refrigerator should be

ignited, a violent explosion is very likely to occur. Employees could be injured or killed and the

laboratory, the building, and the product of years of research could be destroyed. Not only

would there be immediate problems, but in most cases, replacing laboratory space would be very

expensive, currently in the vicinity of $130 to $300 per square foot. Actual construction of

replacement space for buildings as complex as most laboratories, from the time of planning to

completion of construction, typically takes 4 years or more after the money is obtained.

Many actions are influenced by the costs involved, as in the preceding example. A

cont inuing question involves who should be responsible for paying for safety facilities and

equipment. Under the OSHA laboratory standard, the adequacy of a facility to allow work to be

done safely is a key condition. There are some straightforward guidelines that can be used:

1. For new construction, safety should be integrated into the building d e s i g n a n d t h e

choice of all fixed equipment. The latter should be incorporated in the building furniture

and equipment package. This would include major items such as fume hoods, since these

are relatively expensive units to retrofit.

2. Certain equipment and operational items common to the entire organization (e.g., fire

extinguishers, emergency lighting, deluge showers, eyewash stations, and fire alarm

systems) and maintenance of these items should be just as much an institutional

responsibility as provision of utilities.

3. Items which are the result of operations unique to the individual laboratory or operations

should be a local responsibility This would include equipment such as flammable

material refrigeration units, flammable material storage cabinets (if these are not built in),

and specialized safety equipment such as radiation monitors, gas monitors, etc. Some

major items which might be included under fixed equipment in new construction might

have to be provided by the individual if renovation of a space were to be involved. For

example, it might be necessary to construct a shaft to enclose a fume hood duct and to

provide a sourc e of additional makeup air for the hood. The expense for personal

protective equipment, such as goggles, face masks, respirators, and gloves, should also

be provided at either the laboratory or departmental level.

It is unlikely that any individual, whether it is the laboratory supervisor, safety professional,

planner, or architect, will alone be sufficiently knowledgeable or have the requisite skills to make

appropriate decisions for all of the factors discussed in this section. In addition, every one of

these persons will have their own agenda. The inclusion of emergency preparedness features

should be explicitly included as one of the charges to the building or project design committee



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so that these needs can be integrated with function, efficiency, esthetics, and cost.

It was not the intent at this point to elaborate on all the implications of codes as safety

issues but, by a few examples, to draw attention to the idea that the root cause of an emergency

and the potential for successfully dealing with it could well lie with decisions made years earlier.

The point that was intended to be made was that laboratory safety and the capability to respond

to emergencies does not start and end with teaching good laboratory technique and the

adoption of an emergency response plan after beginning operations.

B. Institutional or Corporate Emergency Committee

In most organizations, there are many support groups that have been assigned specific

responsibilities in dealing with emergencies which extend beyond those associated only with

laboratories. Among these are safety, police or security, maintenance, communications, legal

counsel, and media or public relations. Unlike the laboratory supervisor, departmental chair or

individual laboratory employee who is primarily concerned with his research or administrative

duties, these groups are directly concerned with one or more aspects of emergency response.

In larger organizations, fire departments, physicians or medical services, or even more specialized

groups may exist in-house. Each of these groups have their own expertise, their own dedicated

resources, and their own contacts with outside agencies. Representatives from these agencies

will be the ones normally called to the scene of an emergency and will be the ones expected to

cope with the situation. This group should form the nucleus of the emergency planning

committee but it should also include participation from the remainder of the organization. In the

current context, this participation should include comprehensive coverage of the various areas

of the corporate or institutional research programs. The committee should have direct access to

upper levels of management, and it should also interact closely with s afety committees

associated with each broad research area, e.g., chemical, radiation, biosafety, and animal care.

This committee also needs to coordinate its efforts with non-organizational support groups such

as local, state, and federal police authorities, fire departments, rescue units, local emergency

planning groups, environmental regulatory agencies such as EPA and local or regional water,

air, and waste management agencies, and safety regulatory groups such as OSHA. Note that the

emergency committee does not have the responsibility to manage the res p o n s e to an actual

incident. The emergency committee, once formed and its charge clearly defined, should meet

periodically (at least once a year and preferably more often) to review the status of the

organization’s emergency preparedness, to plan for practice sessions, to review drills that

have been conducted, and to investigate and review incidents that have occurred. Reports of

thes e meetings, along with the findings, should be presented to management and to the

individual safety committees.



C. Emergency Plan

The initial order of business for the emergency committee is to develop an emergency

response plan (ERP). In developing the ERP, the committee should analyze the types of

emergencies which could happen, their relative seriousness, and their relative probability of

occurrence, in other words, perform an organizational hazard analysis. The emergencies to be

considered should specifically include releas es of hazardous and toxic chemicals to the

environment, as required under SARA, Title III (Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization

Act of 1986). Once the classes of emergencies have been defined, each should be analyzed as

to the resources, equipment, training, and manpower which would be needed for an adequate

response. An integral part of this analysis would be provisional plans for using these resources

to respond to potential emergencies. The analysis should include both internal and external

resources. Finally, a critical evaluation should be made of the current status of the institutional

resources and a recommendation made to correct deficiencies. Based on the preliminary studies,

the final plan should be drafted, circulated for review, amended if required , and implemented.

The support of management is critical, or this effort would be wasted.



©2000 CRC Press LLC



Figure 2.1 A sign such as this placed at each telephone is an

effective way to inform people how to notify authorities.



Plans should be developed which would be operative at differing levels. A basic plan should

be short and easy to understand and to implement. The simple sign in Figure 2.1 above is effective for most emergencies. The caller is expected to be guided by the person (usually a

dispatcher) at the other end of the line for specific guidance for the appropriate response to the

immediate problem. The major caveat is that the time to make such a call may not be available prior

to evacuation for emergencies representing immediate and worsening emergency situations.

Occupants of a facility should be trained to recognize when this condition exists and know how

to initiate an evacuation of as large an area as necessary.

1. Laboratory Emergency Plan

Workers in most laboratories normally are intelligent, knowledgeable individuals and can

cope with many small emergencies such as a spill of a liter of sulfuric acid or a small fire if they

have received appropriate emergency training. Such training is mandatory under the OSHA

laboratory standard. A comprehensive laboratory emergency response plan is required under

current standards for the risks associated with operations within the facility. The plan needs to

include basic information such as risk recognition appropriate to the operations of the facility,

means of internal responses to small to moderate emergencies, and evacuation training. All

employees in the laboratory must receive instruction on these points at the time of beginning

work in the facility, or when any new procedure or operation is introduced posing different risks.

In order to identify potential risks, a detailed, thorough hazard analysis needs to have been done,

based on the things that could go wrong, not just the risks associated with normal operations.

Among information which must be included in the plan is where an employee can get not only

the laboratory specific plan, but also the organization’s overall plan. Another key ingredient of

the plan is where safety and health information for the chemicals used in the laboratory, as

represented by Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs), can be readily provided.

A written emergency plan for an individual laboratory might, in outline, resemble the

following:

I.



In bold letters, the basic number to call in the event of an emergency, perhaps 911or



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