Chapter 14. Physical Security Concepts and Applications

162



14. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS



added benefit of the security planning process

is the potential for increased security awareness

throughout every level of the organization.

The security planning process consists of the

following five steps:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.



Assets are identified.

Loss events are exposed.

Occurrence probability factors are assigned.

Impact of occurrence is assessed.

Countermeasures are selected.

Let’s look at each of these steps.



1. Assets are identified

At first glance, this step would appear easy;

however, this is not necessarily the case. Have

you ever attempted to take inventory of your

personal property? The major problem seems

to be “how to;” that is, do we include every nut

and bolt? For the purpose of following the security process, this is not necessary. It should suffice to group assets according to category except

where an item is especially attractive (from a

thief’s viewpoint) and valuable. The following

categories should encompass the majority of

assets for most companies:

– land



– buildings



– heavy machinery



– production equipment



– office equipment



– office furniture



– vehicles



– cash or other negotiables



– goodwill



– public image



– raw material



– finished product



Depending on the nature of the company’s

activities, there may be other categories. In any

event, there is one asset which has not been

mentioned primarily because it is controversial:

employees. Employees are a company’s most

valuable asset, although some people do not

like to group them with all the other assets.

2. Loss events are exposed

This step consists of exposing all possible

threats to the assets that were identified. Similar

to how we group assets, we group threats



according to their nature. All threats can be

grouped under the following headings: industrial disaster, natural disaster, civil disturbance,

crime, and other risks.

Industrial disasters—these should be easy

to identify, associated threats related to on-site

or adjacent activity. The following are typical industrial disasters that might affect most

companies: explosions, fires, major accidents,

and structural collapse. To correctly assess the

threat, you must intimately know the nature of

company activity, the nature of activity on adjacent properties, dangerous routes, flight paths,

and the existence of nearby major oil or gas

pipelines.

Natural disasters—the potential for a natural disaster largely rests with the geographic

location of the company property. If the property is located in the southeast United States, it

is reasonable to identify hurricanes as possible

loss events. Similarly, if the property is located

in California, it would be reasonable to plan for

earthquakes. Other areas may suggest the need

to identify floods or tornados as threats.

Civil disturbance—most companies can be

threatened either directly or indirectly by actions

that can be categorized as civil disturbances. If

your company is engaged in weapons technology, or indeed any activity that might be viewed

as threatening the environment, it is reasonable

to expect that the company might become the

target of demonstrators. All labor disputes fall

under this heading.

Crime—it is relatively easy to identify crimes

that might affect company operations. Any

or all of the following will affect most companies: arson, assault, bomb threats, breaking and

entering, theft, and vandalism. If a company is

engaged in high-tech, it would be reasonable to

also include espionage, extortion, and sabotage

as likely threats.

Other risks—this is meant to be a catch-all

for those threats that do not neatly fit the above

categories. Two examples are disturbed persons

and loss of utilities.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



PHYSICAL SECURITY PLANNING



3. Occurrence probability factors are assigned

Having identified assets and exposed the

threats to those assets, the next step is to quantify the possibility that the threat will occur.

This is probably the most difficult step in the

process. Information must be collected and

carefully analyzed to determine its effect on the

probability for occurrence. The following affect

probability:

●



●



●



●



●



The physical composition of structures—for

example, wood frame or concrete block

The climatic history of the area, such

as number and frequency of tornados,

hurricanes, earthquakes, and so on

The nature of activity at the property to

be protected. For example, if the products

being produced are televisions and related

products, then the probability for theft will

likely be high

The criminal history for the local and

adjacent areas

Is there community conflict in the area?



An analysis of the foregoing, coupled with

a review of the activity and organization of the

company to be protected, will enable one to

make a determination with reasonable accuracy

regarding the probability for a loss relative to

specific assets or groups of assets.

The probability for occurrence will not be the

same for all loss events. For this reason and to

facilitate later correlation with impact factors,

we must assign probability ratings. While the

actual wording is not important, the following

are suggested:

●

●

●

●



Certain

Highly probable

Moderately probable

Improbable



To make these words more meaningful, we

can assign percentage weights to each: certain ϭ

75–100%; highly probable ϭ 50–75%; moderately

probable ϭ 25–50%; and improbable ϭ 0–25%.



163



4. Impact of occurrence is assessed

This step is not as difficult or as uncertain

as determining probability. Impact for almost

all organizations has a bottom line of dollars

and cents. The most important thing to remember is that dollar losses may be either direct or

indirect and that they may be so high as to be

crippling.

Direct costs are those that can be directly

assigned as the value of the asset that has been

lost or damaged. Indirect losses are those costs

associated with the loss that would not have

been incurred if the loss event had not occurred.

An example is downtime.

The final task in relation to impact is to

assign levels or classifications that will allow for

correlation with the four degrees of probability.

Again, the actual words are not important; however, the following are suggested:

●

●

●

●



Very serious

Serious

Moderately serious

Unimportant



We will see the importance of these ratings

shortly. Before we move to the final step, let us

recap: we have taken inventory of our assets,

identified the threats to those assets, assessed

the probability of occurrence for the threats, and

assessed the potential impact on company operations if one of these threats were to occur.

5. Countermeasures are selected

This is the final step in the planning process.

We now have to use all the data we have collected to protect our property in the most efficient manner, while also considering the cost of

these countermeasures in relation to the value

of our assets. The initial step is to decide on the

level of protection needed; the level can range

from low to very high.

When selecting physical security countermeasures, it is imperative that one use a

systematic approach. By standardizing the process, mistakes are less likely to occur and more



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



164



14. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS



accurate calculations can be made. In addition,

one must document the process and keep accurate written records of the recorded data. This

allows for better-informed decisions regarding

the selection and implementation of physical

security countermeasures.

There are several methods or processes available to the security practitioner when selecting countermeasures; however, the simplest

method to ascertain the desired levels of protection is a matrix as illustrated in Figure 14-1.

For example, consider the threat of fire. The

probability of a fire can be rated as “moderately

probable” for most types of businesses; from a

criticality point of view, we must consider fire

as potentially “very serious.”



Referring to our matrix, we can quickly see

that the recommended level of protection is

“level IV,” the highest level possible. This would

suggest using an effective detection system coupled with an efficient suppression system.

The large number and variety of assets and

associated threats means that we will end up

with a complex pattern of different levels of

protection. This is not as confusing as we might

expect, particularly if we think in terms of

security-in-depth.

Security-in-depth, also known as layered

protection, is a concept that means placing a

series of progressively more difficult obstacles

in the path of an aggressor. These obstacles are

often referred to as lines of defense.



Threat Level Matrix

Improbable



Moderately

probable



Highly

probable



Certain



Unimportant



I



I



I



I



Moderately

Serious



I



II



II



II



Serious



II



III



III



IV



Very Serious



III



IV



IV



IV



Levels of Security

I Low

II Medium

III High

IV Very High



FIGURE 14-1



Threat level matrix.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



165



PHYSICAL SECURITY PLANNING



The first line of defense is at the property

line. Methods of defense at this point may be

either natural, such as a river, or manmade,

such as a fence. Additionally, the barrier may

be psychological or physical. At the very minimum, the property boundary must be defined

in some way that separates it from its neighbors. Psychological barriers, such as property

definition, do not impede would-be trespassers;

however, they do play an important role in the

rights of the property owner.

The second line of defense is the exterior of

buildings. Controls at this point should be difficult to overcome. It is important to remember

that all six sides of structures (roof, floor, and

walls) may present weaknesses that must be

strengthened. Special attention must be given to

the usual points of break and enters: doors, windows, and skylights. In fact, any opening greater

than 96 square inches in area and less than 18 feet

from grade must be protected. It is usually at this

line of defense that electronic intrusion detection

devices and electronic access controls are used.

The third line of defense is interior controls or

object protection. Controls at this line of defense

include electronic motion and intruder detection

devices, access controls, safes, vaults, document

storage cabinets, quality locking devices, and fire

protection.

Applying the security-in-depth concept

means more than simply establishing three lines

of defense that will meet all your needs. Ideally,



we would apply the principle first to the property in general terms as described above, and

then to each and every asset separately. An

example would be an industrial complex and

an asset such as information.

The complex itself will probably be protected

by a perimeter fence. Each building within

will be properly secured and there will be electronic intrusion detection systems within the

buildings. In addition to this general protection, we should attempt to establish protective

rings around the information. For example, the

information should be stored in a safe (third

line of defense), the safe should be in a room

that has interior motion detection (second line

of defense), and access to the room should be

through a door equipped with proper locking

hardware and possibly a card access system

(the first line of defense) (Figure 14-2).

Selecting appropriate countermeasures is

a difficult task, requiring considerable practical experience and extensive knowledge of the

various controls and their strengths and weaknesses. Effective planning will result in a costjustified, integrated protection program.

An integrated protection program results from

a systems approach to selecting controls. The following are two important points in relation to

using a systems approach:

1. The whole, rather than its individual parts,

must be considered.



Alleys and rear

properly lighted



Doors locked

and barred

Roof openings

secured

Alarm system

throughout store,

24-hr. phone

number available

Locks modern

and adequate



Fence in

good repair

Windows locked,

barred, or well

secured

Access to roof

protected

Debris cleared



Safe lighted and

in open view

Building interior

well lighted



FIGURE 14-2



Cash drawer open

to prevent damage



Defense around exterior of building.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



166



14. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS



2. Design should allow for an acceptable level

of redundancy, without any unnecessary

duplication of effort.

A systems approach is often referred to as

“systems engineering.”

The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on the physical components of a protection program. While space will not permit great

detail, we will attempt to explain the major

points relative to security lighting, security glazing, alarm systems, card access systems, locks

and keying, closed circuit television, safes and

vaults, and fencing.



SECURITY LIGHTING

Security lighting has three primary objectives:

1. It must act as a deterrent to intruders.

2. It must make detection likely if an intrusion

is attempted.

3. It should not unnecessarily expose patrolling

personnel.

Lighting systems are often referred to

as “continuous,” “standby,” and “movable” or

“emergency.”

Continuous lighting is most commonly used.

Lamps are mounted on fixed luminaries and are

normally lit during the hours of darkness.

Standby lighting is different from continuous lighting in that the lamps are only lit as

required.

Movable or emergency lighting is portable

lighting that may be used to supplement either

continuous or standby lighting. Light sources

may be incandescent, gaseous discharge, or

quartz lamps. The common lightbulb emits

incandescent light.

Gaseous discharge lamps are street-type

lighting and may be either mercury vapor or

sodium vapor lamps. Mercury vapor lamps

emit a strong light with a bluish cast. Sodium

vapor lamps emit a soft yellow light. Both



types of gaseous discharge lamps take 2 to 5

minutes to reach maximum intensity. They are

very effective in areas where fog is prevalent.

A word of caution in relation to gaseous discharge lamps is that they make color identification unreliable.

Metal halide lamps are also of a gaseous

type, but due to the excellent color rendition

this lamp offers, it is recommended for many

security applications. Metal halide lamps can be

used very effectively with color CCTV cameras

due to the light properties which imitate natural daylight. The downside of this lamp is that

it is expensive to use.

Incandescent lamps are typically used in residential homes for lighting. They are very inefficient and have limited use for security purposes

due to the short lifecycle and expense of use.

Quartz lamps emit a very bright white

light. Lighting may be classified as floodlights,

searchlights, fresnels, and street lighting. The

difference between floodlights and searchlights

is that searchlights project a highly focused

beam of light, whereas floodlights project a

concentrated beam. Fresnels produce a rectangular beam of light and are particularly suitable for illuminating the exterior of buildings.

Streetlights produce a diffused light and are

suitable for use in parking areas and driveways.

Certain lighting intensities are recommended

for specific situations.

Perimeter or property boundary



0.15 to 0.4 fc



Parking lots (open)



2.0 to 3.0 fc



Parking garage (enclosed)



5.0 to 6.0 fc



Vehicle entrances



1.0 fc



Pedestrian entrances (active)



5.0 fc



Exterior of buildings



1.0 fc



Open yards



0.2 fc



The foregoing are suggested lighting intensities only; specific circumstances may dictate

different intensities. To explain the suggested

intensities, “fc” means foot-candle and simply



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



167



GLAZING



refers to the amount of light emitted within 1

square foot of a lit standard candle.



APPLICATION CONSIDERATIONS

1. When designing a protective lighting system,

consider three lines of defense: the perimeter,

open yards, and building exteriors.

2. All accessible exterior lamp enclosures

should be in tamper- or vandal-resistive

housing. This means that the receptacle

and lens should be constructed of a material

that will resist damage if attacked and that

the mounting screws or bolts should be

tamper-resistant.

3. If protective lighting is to be located in an

area that may be subject to explosions, the

housings should be explosive-resistant.

4. Before finalizing any decision on the

installation of lighting, consider the impact

that additional lighting will have on your

neighbors. Failure to consult with a neighbor

prior to an installation may result in costly

redesign.

The foregoing is a presentation of the basics

of security lighting. Prior to utilizing any of the

suggested standards, please check local codes

or ordinances.



GLAZING

The various uses, methods of fabrication, and

overabundance of trade names make the selection of an appropriate glazing material appear

very confusing. In an effort to simplify the process, we will address the subject under the following headings:

●

●

●

●



Safety/fire

Burglar/vandal-resistive

Bullet resistive

Special purpose



Safety/fire: Under this heading, we are basically looking at two types of glass: tempered

and wired.

Tempered glass can be considered safety

glass, as it is several times stronger than ordinary glass. It is especially resistive to accidental

breakage. If it does break, it will disintegrate into

small pieces with dull edges, thereby minimizing risk of injury. Tempered glass is available in

different thicknesses to suit different purposes.

Wired glass is glass with a wire mesh built

into it. The wire is embedded in the glass when

it is still in its molten state. Wire glass resists

impact because of its strength. It is also listed by

Underwriter’s Laboratories as a fire-retardant

material.

Here are some suggested uses for safety/fireretardant glass:

●

●

●

●



Passageways

Entrance doors and adjacent panels

Sliding glass doors

Bathtub enclosures and shower doors



Burglar/vandal-resistive: Several types of

burglar/vandal-resistive glazing materials are

available, including laminated glass, wired

glass and acrylic, and polycarbonate plastics.

Laminated glass will resist degrees of impact

proportionate to its thickness. This type of glass is

particularly valuable where the quality of transparency is important and where other types of

impact-resistant material may be subject to vandalism. Wired glass provides resistance of a limited

nature; it will not resist prolonged attack. Acrylic

plastic is particularly resistive to forced attack;

however, it is not as resistive as polycarbonate. It

is, however, much more transparent than polycarbonate. Polycarbonate plastic is 20 to 30 times

stronger than acrylic of comparable thickness.

Bullet resistive: Bullet-resistive material is

available in the form of laminated glass or acrylic

and polycarbonate plastics. Bullet-resistant laminated glass consists of multiple piles of glass and

plastic material laminated together. Highly transparent, bullet-resistant acrylic material is suitable



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



168



14. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS



for many cash-handling situations, such as those

which occur in banks. Polycarbonate, consisting

of several sheets of plastic laminated together, is

highly resistive to ballistics; however, visibility is

somewhat impaired.

Special purpose: Under this heading, we will

look at transparent mirror glass, coated glass,

heated glass, and rough or patterned glass.

Transparent mirror glass may be installed in a

door or in a wall. From one side, it is functionally

a mirror, and from the other, it permits an unobstructed view through the mirror. The primary

purpose of transparent glass is for surreptitious

surveillance. Flow-on or cement-on plastic coating is available for application to existing installed

glass. This material may serve well as an interim

measure until a more appropriate vandal-resistive

material can be installed. Rough or patterned glass

is available with many different designs that make

it range from practically opaque to practically

transparent. This type of glazing is most appropriate where there is a conflict between the need for

privacy and natural light.



INTRUSION DETECTION

Every intrusion detection system is meant to

detect the following:

1. Unauthorized entry

2. Unauthorized movement within

3. Unauthorized access to controlled areas or

objects

There are three components to an intrusion

detection system:

1. Detectors/sensors

2. System controls

3. Signal transmission



Detectors/Sensors

The design and implementation of intrusion

sensors are critical for any physical security



program. Intrusion sensors are typically integrated with physical barriers, such as a door

or window, and must take environmental

conditions into consideration to be effective.

Selection of the appropriate detector, from the

numerous and varied options available, is often

a difficult task. The end user is well-advised

to become familiar with the different types of

detectors/sensors available and must evaluate

both the application and environmental conditions prior to implementation. If relying on

advice from a vendor for proper intrusion sensor selection, it is essential that the end user

describe their objectives and make the vendor

contractually responsible for meeting those

stated objectives.

In the following paragraphs, we will look at

different types of detectors: magnetic switches,

metallic foil, audio, vibration, ultrasonic, photoelectric, passive infrared, microwave, dual technology, and video motion.

Magnetic switches: These are often referred

to as door contacts. They may be either surface-mounted or recessed. The choice is largely

an aesthetic one; however, the recessed ones

do afford more protection from tampering.

Switches are commonly “unbalanced,” which

means that they may be defeated by substitution of a secondary magnetic field to keep the

contacts in the open position while the detector

magnet is moved away from the housing containing the contacts.

For high-security applications, a “balanced”

switch is available. This switch is designed to

withstand defeat by creation of a secondary

magnetic field. Magnetic switches have many

potential uses in addition to their traditional

use on doors and windows. They may be used

on desk or file cabinet drawers or to secure

equipment to a fixed position.

Metallic foil: This is a narrow strip of metal

foil designed to break if the surface to which

it is attached is attacked. It is mostly used as

a glass breakage detector and is commonly

seen on storefront windows and glass doors.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



INTRUSION DETECTION



It may also be used as a barrier penetration

detector, such as in a wall under gyprock. If

properly installed, it should do its job well.

A major detractor is that it is not considered

aesthetically pleasing; this can also be overcome

to some extent by the experienced installer.

Vibration: Vibration detectors are shock sensors. They may be used to detect persons climbing chain-link fencing, breaking through walls,

or attacking safes or other containers. As glass

breakage detectors, they are very effective and

not too expensive.

Ultrasonic: These are motion detectors. A

protected area is flooded with an oval pattern

of sound waves. As the sound waves bounce off

objects, they reflect a signal back to a receiver.

Any movement in the protected area will cause

a change in the reflected pattern, which will

result in an alarm. Ultrasonic sound waves are

in a frequency range that is above the capacity of the human ear. These detectors are particularly susceptible to false alarm due to air

turbulence.

Photoelectric: A beam of light is transmitted

to a receiver. The transmitter and receiver may

be in one housing with the beam reflected. Any

interruption of the beam causes an alarm. These

devices are commonly used as automatic door

openers or in stores to ward off a customer from

entering. When used for security purposes, different methods are used to make the beam

invisible to the naked eye. Either an infrared

light-emitting diode is used or an infrared filter is simply placed over the light source. Either

method effectively makes the beam invisible.

Infrared: These are probably the most versatile detectors currently available. Patterns of

coverage are available that will protect practically any configuration of space. They can be

used effectively to protect long narrow corridors, portions of rooms, or entire large rooms.

Infrared detectors are often referred to as passive detectors because they are the only detector

that does not monitor an environment that has

been created by the detector. Infrared detectors



169



measure radiated energy. When activated, they

simply establish the ambient temperature. From

that point on, any significant deviation will

result in an alarm.

Microwave: Microwave detectors use highfrequency radio waves to establish a protected

area. They are particularly suitable for use in

areas where air turbulence or changing air temperatures may prohibit the use of ultrasonic

or infrared detectors. A major weakness with

microwave is that it can penetrate beyond a

protected area. Microwaves will penetrate practically all surfaces except concrete and metal.

Dual technology: Dual technology sensors

combine two technologies into a single sensor.

An example of this would be to combine a passive infrared sensor with a microwave sensor.

An alarm signal is not generated until both

sensing devices are triggered. Thus, the use of

such technology should result in fewer nuisance alarms being generated if installed correctly and applied properly.

Video motion: Using CCTV cameras to initiate an alarm is another method that can be

utilized for intrusion detection. Video motion

technology detects changes in light brightness

levels within the coverage area. It is advisable

to only use video motion detection for an interior application due to the varied environmental conditions which exist outdoors. Vibrations,

moving objects such as trees and bushes, and

fluctuating light levels can trigger nuisance

alarms when using video motion; they may render the system ineffective.



System Controls

System controls consist of components that

transform individual detectors/sensors into

a network of intelligence-gathering devices.

System controls include data processing equipment, signal transmission equipment, on/off

and reset controls, backup power supply, LED

system status indicators, and any other equipment specific to a particular system.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



170



14. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS



The data processing equipment basically

acts as a receiver and interpreter of signals

from the sensors/detectors and reacts to these

signals in accordance with preprogrammed

instructions.

The signal transmission equipment is the

means by which an alarm is raised. This equipment may simply activate a local siren, or it

may send a signal over telephone wires to a

remote monitoring location. The telephone

wires may be either dedicated (the most secure

system) or through the normal telephone network by use of a digital dialer that transmits to

a special type of receiver/decoder.

The on/off and reset controls can be keys,

toggle switches, or digital keypads. The digital

keypad is recommended. The backup power

supply is essential in case the electrical power

supply fails or is sabotaged.

The LED (light-emitting diode) system status indicators use different colors to indicate

whether the system is on or off, or if there is

trouble in the system. The usual colors are red

for system okay (but in the off mode), yellow

for trouble somewhere in the system, and green

for armed and properly functioning.



SYSTEM MONITORING

There are basically three options:

1. Local

2. Proprietary

3. Commercial

A local system is just that, a siren or bell on

the outside of the protected premises. This system is not recommended due to its reliance on a

passerby to actually call the police.

The proprietary system is similar to a local

system in that the system is monitored on-site

or remotely by employees of the owner of the

protected premises. If this system is used, it is

advisable to have a link from the proprietary



station to a commercial station in the event of a

holdup of the monitoring personnel.

Commercial monitoring falls into two categories: monitoring stations or answering services. The answering services are useful for the

economical monitoring of signals transmitted

by telephone dialers; however, this is not for

high security systems. Commercial monitoring

stations are either Underwriters Laboratories

(UL) approved or they are not. UL-approved is

the best guarantee of quality service.

Note: An initial step in planning an intrusion

detection system is to identify zones of protection in the building that will create a series

of independent subsystems. Each subsystem

should (1) be compatible with normal operations, and (2) allow for prompt response to a

specific problem area.

When the functional requirements of a system have been identified, the system engineering should be left to experts.



CARD ACCESS

The decision to use, or not to use, a card

access system should be based on the perceived

need for accountability and the accompanying

financial considerations. An objective statement

for a card access system might read: “To economically eliminate the inherent security weaknesses in key access systems by electronically

supervising and documenting the activities or

persons authorized to access the property.”

To be useful, a card access system should

have the following minimum capabilities:

●



●



●



Restrict access by authorized persons

to certain times and/or days of the

week.

Allow controlled after-hours access to

selected areas within.

Control after-hours access to a

parkade.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



171



LOCKING HARDWARE

●



●



●



●

●

●

●

●

●



Selectively control after-hours use of

elevators.

Maintain a record of all valid and invalid use

of cards.

Provide an audit trail permitting a printout

of persons on the property at any one time.

There are numerous types of cards:

Magnetic coded

Magnetic strip coded

Proximity coded

Weigand coded

Hollerith

Optical coded



The magnetic coded card contains a sheet of

flexible magnetic material on which an array of

spots have been permanently magnetized. The

code is determined by the polarity of the magnetized spots. The magnetic strip encoding is

widely used in commercial credit cards. The

proximity card is a badge into which electronically tuned circuits are laminated. The badge

gets its name from the fact that it only has to be

held near the reader for authorized access to be

granted. The reader for this card is concealed

in the wall behind drywall or paneling. The

Weigand-coded badge contains a series of parallel wires embedded in the bottom half of the

badge. Each wire can be assigned a logic “0” or

“1;” the combination reveals the ID number.

The Hollerith badge is easy to recognize

because the card has small rectangular holes

punched in it. It cannot be considered a highsecurity badge. The optical coded badge is easy

to recognize if it uses a barcode as its encoding

device. The barcode is commonly used on retail

goods to assist the cashier with pricing.

All of the commonly used coded cards are

reliable and, with the exception of the Hollerith

badge, are reasonably resistive to compromise.

Although it is not recommended, many organizations like to use their access cards as both

an access card and an identification badge. The

information contained in the normal employee



ID card can easily be incorporated into any access

card:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●



Company name and logo

Details of cardholder

Name

Department

Date of birth

Signature

Photograph

Condition of use (restrictions)



This is not recommended, however, because

if the card is lost, it will be obvious to the finder

that it is owned by a particular organization,

which may lead to unauthorized use of the

card. There are many different card readers; the

significant difference among them is the addition of a secondary method of verification or

confirmation, such as the requirement for insertion of a personal identification number (PIN),

through a numerical keypad.

The use of a numerical keypad usually offers

the valuable option of allowing a user to signal

that he is operating under duress.

Figure 14-3 shows the functional operation of

a card access system.



LOCKING HARDWARE

Locking hardware can be categorized as

mechanical, electrical, or electromagnetic, and

as either security or nonsecurity.

Quality mechanical security locks should be

used for all of the following:

●

●



●



Perimeter openings

Doors that control/restrict internal

movement

Doors to sensitive/restricted areas



Only deadbolt locks should be considered.

The bolt should offer a minimum of 1-inch

throw. If the door is a glass metal-framed door,

the bolt should be of the pivotal type to ensure

maximum throw.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY



172

Badge input

into reader



14. PHYSICAL SECURITY CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS



Proper

type of

badge



FIGURE 14-3 Functional operation of a card



Send badge

number for

analysis



access system.



Badge

number

analyzed



Valid

badge

number



Time zone

allows access



Door opens

for seconds



Door

relocks



Electric locks are particularly suitable for the

following:

●



●

●

●



Remote control of the after-hours pedestrian

entrance door

Grade-level emergency exit doors

Exit doors from stairwells to grade level

All stairwell doors



Electric locks are available where the strike

is normally in the locked or unlocked position.

Electromagnetic locks are particularly suitable for

use on emergency exit doors, as there are no moving parts that can accidentally become jammed.

Several conditions must be met before this type

of lock can be used on an emergency exit door:

●



●



●



A manual or automated egress device to

unlock door within close proximity.

When activated, the fire alarm system must

be able to automatically deactivate the

locking device.

Each location must have a fire pull station

in its vicinity, and its activation must

automatically deactivate the lock.



Note: It is essential that the fire department

be consulted prior to any final decision on the

locks of any door that may be considered an

emergency exit. Get their decision in writing,

and carefully consider it before compliance.

Emergency exit devices that are normally

used on emergency exit doors cause justifiable security concern. If permitted, only quality electric or electromagnetic locks should

be used. If electric or magnetic locks cannot be

used, great care should be taken to ensure

the emergency devices use such features as

the following:

●

●

●



Deadbolts

Deadlocking latches

Vertical locking bars for pairs of doors



Remember that emergency exit devices can

be connected to a proprietary or commercially

monitored alarm system. Loud local alarms

are also an effective way to protect emergency

exits.



IV. CRIME PREVENTION AND PHYSICAL SECURITY