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Installation of pressurized apparatus 555
established to be above the 50N/m2 minimum and below the maximum
acceptable pressure specified for the enclosure. The purge timing may begin
when all of these conditions are met.
If during the purge time the flow of protective gas falls below the
minimum figure specified, the flow detection device should initiate a cessation of purge and purging should not again begin until the purge criteria
are re-established. The purge timing should then begin again from zero.
Likewise if the pressure in the enclosure falls below the minimum specified figure or rises above the maximum permitted overpressure the purge
should be shut down and restarted only when the correct conditions have
been re-established. Additionally, in the case of overpressurization of the
enclosure or ducting, the enclosure (and, if necessary, the ducting separately) should be vented or its supply of gas removed to prevent damage.
The electrical circuits within the enclosure must remain isolated from
all supplies and other unprotected electrical circuits (circuits not otherwise
explosion protected) during this purge period.
Normal operation
When the purge has been completed and the time delay relay or other timing
device indicates this to be so then, provided the flow and pressure conditions
remain within those acceptable, the outlet of the enclosure is closed (in the
case of pressurization with leakage compensation)or reduced in size (in the
case of pressurization with continuous flow of protective gas). At this time
provided the internal pressure remains within its limits and, in the case of
continuous flow, the flowrate is above the minimum specified for normal
operation, the electrical circuits within the enclosure may be energized and
the other energized intelligence connected circuits (such as control and intelligence transmission circuits which were isolated) may be reconnected.
Actions on faults in the system
If the pressure inside the enclosure falls below the minimum of 50N/m2
or the flow, in the case of enclosures with continuous flow of protective
gas, falls below its acceptable minimum, the monitoring devices should
identify this.
In all cases (both where the enclosure does not have flammable
materials fed into it and where it does have limited normal and any
abnormal release) the action required on this identification is given in
Table 19.5. The alarm-only requirement for apparatus suitable for Zone 2
without isolation refers only to Zone 2 compatible apparatus (i.e., Type
'N' apparatus and suitably selected industrial non-sparking apparatus) and
not to all non-sparking apparatus. It is also only of limited term and if
the pressurization cannot be restored in a short time (say four hours) then
isolation must take place. In this case it can be automatic or manual rather
than automatic only as is the case with immediate isolation requirements.
556 Electrical installations in hazardous areas
Table 1 . Alarm and shut-down requirements for pressur95
ized enclosures without internal releases
Classification of
area of
installation
Zone 1
Zone 2
Enclosure contains
apparatus
Suitable for use
in Zone 2 without
pressurization
Enclosure contains
apparatus not
suitable for use
in Zone 2 without
pressurization
Alarm (Note)
No action
Alarm and isolation
Alarm (Note)
Note: Only valid i the short term. If situation persists then isolation will
n
be required.
Where it is not possible to isolate apparatus in situations where isolation
(either immediately or delayed) is necessary it is not acceptable to waive
this requirement. Thus some more reliable pressurization method, such as
the use of main and standby pressurization supplies, must be used with
isolation not necessary unless both supplies fail. If this is not possible then
the technique of pressurization is not possible.
19.7 Multiple enclosures
There is nothing in principal to prevent several enclosures from being pressurized from the same source provided that no action in respect of any one
of the enclosures results in any other enclosures in the group exceeding any
of the pressure/ flow requirements applied to them. This normally precludes
serial connection of enclosures and is subject to the following requirements:
1. Opening of any door or cover in any one of the enclosures is preceded by
manual or automatic isolation of that particular enclosure. (It is recommended that this action be automatic wherever it is possible, usually
executed by a switch which senses the opening of the door as soon as
opening is started thus ensuring isolation occurs before the door is fully
open). If there is residual heat in the enclosure it will be marked with
the minimum time before which opening can commence and in such
circumstances isolation will need to be manual.
2. The pressures and flow rates in the other enclosures in the group are not
affected to the extent that they exceed the appropriate limits and their
parameters continue to be monitored effectively.
3. When any enclosure in the group has been de-pressurized it must go
through its entire purge cycle after pressurization is restored and before
the electrical equipment enclosed is re-energized and other unprotected
electrical circuits reconnected.
Installation of pressurized apparatus 557
Process gas to
PC(Hi) = High pressure switch (alternative positions shown)
PC(Lo) = Low pressure switch (alternative positions shown)
FIC(Lo) = Low flow switch
Fig. 19.5 Typical pressurization control system. Notes: (1) The control unit should
be mounted in a non-hazardous area or suitable for potentially explosive
atmospheres (e.g., flameproof). (2) All electrical switches and electrically
operated valves to be suitable for hazardous areas (e.g., flameproof or
intrinsically safe).
19.8 Typical pressurization control system
A typical pressurization control system is shown in Fig. 19.5. It will be noted
that the flow monitor device needs to be in the exhaust duct or very close
thereto to ensure that it monitors the flow leaving the enclosure. Where the
exhaust ducting is long it needs to be close to the valve which closes after
purging or the restrictor which controls operational flow to ensure that it
identifies leakage in the ducting. Likewise, the low pressure indicator needs
to identify the pressurization of the exhaust duct as well as the enclosure
where the latter is long.
19.9 Pressurized enclosures in dust risks
Installations should comply with the requirements applied to gas/vapour
risk areas installations in Zone 21 and with requirements for installations
in Zone 1, and those for Zone 22 with Zone 2 requirements. In addition the
ducting used in any installation must ensure that, although the enclosure
may not remain IP6X (for Zone 21) or IP5X for (Zone 22) after pressure
failure when the ducting is no longer pressurized closures are present which
558
Electrical installations in hazardous areas
effectively prevent the ingress of dust by closure of outlet apertures. The
ducts themselves must, with the exception of their outlets, satisfy these
enclosure integrity requirements.
Table 1 . Alarm and shut-down requirements for enclosures with internal
96
sources of release
Internal release
description
Enclosure is in
Zone 1
and contains:
NonZone 2
Protected
protected
Enclosure is in
Zone 2
and contains:
Zone 2
NonProtected
protected
No normal
Alarm
Alarm and
release and
limited
abnormal release
No normal
release and
unlimited
abnormal release
Limited normal
and abnormal
release
Limited normal
release and
unlimited
abnormal release
(Note)
isolate
Alarm
(Note)
Alarm and
Isolate
No action
alarm
(Note)
Alarm and
isolate
Alarm
(Note)
Alarm and
isolate
Alarm
(Note)
Alarm and
Alarm
(Note)
Alarm and
isolate
isolate
No action
Alarm
(Note)
Alarm
(Note)
Note: Although it is permitted to maintain the apparatus energized this is a short term relaxation only and if the pressurization is not quickly reinstated isolation is also, necessary particularly where normal releases occur
19.10 Analyser houses
Analyser Houses have become very common over the last decade or
so. These are small, usually prefabricated, buildings into which several
instruments and analysers are fitted and which are regularly accessed by
personnel. They are common where more sophisticated analytical processes
are carried out, requiring apparatus which is not necessarily appropriate
to outdoor mounting. Analyser houses are pressurized to prevent any
external explosive atmosphere from entering the house thus permitting
the use of normal electrical apparatus. They also, however, normally have
flammable materials fed into analysers within them and these constitute
internal sources of release, and can have an effect on the external hazardous
area by release of explosive atmosphere into that area. There are three
considerations:
Installation of pressurized apparatus 559
1. Purging and subsequent pressurization of the analyser house to exclude
external explosive atmospheres.
2. Purging and subsequent pressurization of the analyser house or the analysers within it to dilute the release of flammable atmospheres within the
analyser house or analysers therein.
3. Purging and pressurization of the analyser house to ensure that it is safe
for personnel to enter.
79.10.1 Pressurization considerations
Exclusion of external atmosphere
For the purposes of external atmosphere, exclusion is only necessary to
follow the procedures for a pressurized enclosure without internal sources
of release. As people may enter this enclosure, however, pressurization
with inert gas is not permitted and thus air must be used. Likewise, it is
preferable to use a fan system rather than compressed air and to utilize a
continuous flow of air rather than leakage compensation. The continuous
flow to satisfy this requirement will normally be five times the analyser
house volume as in other cases (see BS 5345, Part 55).
Dilution of internal sources of release
The instruments within the analyser house may release flammable material into the house normally or in fault conditions. This may be liquid or
gas/vapour/mist.
In the case of liquid it is necessary to provide a drain which removes the
liquid from the house expeditiouslyto a collection point such as a blow egg,
and this provides a further aperture as far as pressurization is concerned
which exhausts gas and vapour to the external atmosphere unless exit is
via a closed lute which prevents this.
The releases of flammable gases, vapour or mists released within the analyser house must be diluted to 25 per cent of their lower explosive limit in all
but the dilution areas within the analyser house. These dilution areas need
to be small so that people are not likely to enter them and must not include
any electrical apparatus except that which is protected appropriately for
use in an explosive atmosphere of the appropriate Zone in the absence of
pressurization. (This means that for a normal release only intrinsically safe
apparatus may be used in the dilution area, and for abnormal release only
apparatus suitable for Zone 1 use). Entry of feeds of flammable gases or
vapours must thus be restricted to as low a pressure as possible, and pressures of less than 5 x 104 N/m2 maximum are recommended to reduce the
volume of any leaks. Likewise, the same maximum pressures for liquid lines
inside the house are recommended both to reduce leakage and to prevent
mists forming. Where fast sample loops are necessary to reduce sampling
560 Electrical installations in hazardous areas
times for both liquids and gases/vapours these should terminate outside
the analyser house, and inputs to the house in all cases should have pressure
relief facilities if their pressure could rise above the values recommended
above. Flow restrictors should also be provided where necessary to limit
the flow into the analyser house and hence the release in fault conditions.
Where flammable material in the form of gas or vapour is deliberately
released as a function of the apparatus into which it is fed, it should preferably be exhausted outside the house taking account of its effect on external
area classification. If this is not possible then the apparatus should be separately pressurized with air within the house so that any release into the
house is normally non-explosive.
It is very difficult to make the airflow through the house to dilute areas
of any normal or abnormal release sufficiently small without producing
an airflow which is uncomfortable to personnel. A release of ethylene, for
example, at a rate of 0.015m3/m (250ml/s) would require an airflow of
6m3/m to dilute it to 25 per cent of the lower explosive limit of ethylene
at the exhaust of the house (based on the equations in Chapter 4 for an
aperture of 10-6m3 and a pressure of 5 x l@kg/m2). In the case of an
analyser house the dilution needs to take place in the small area of the house
where the leak occurs to ensure the remainder of the house is gas free. This
would require significant airflow to ensure dilution in that small distance.
This often conflicts with the normal expectation that air movement velocities
in excess of 0.5 m/s are not acceptable indoors which would militate against
the level of airflow required in some circumstances. Where this occurs a
possible solution is to provide airflow outlets close to the sources of release
of sufficient velocity to cause rapid dilution. As the air expands into the
analyser house the flow velocity rapidly reduces to an acceptable level.
Another variation is to provide such local outlets but also provide local
extract so that releases are diluted and removed from the analyser house
locally to the point of release. This latter approach must be treated with
caution as the overall level of operating pressure in the house still needs to
be greater than 50N/m2.
One point which is helpful is that the airflow required inside the analyser
house is not likely to need a velocity of anything like the velocity required
in outdoor situations to achieve rapid dilution as the airflow is controlled
and directed and not random.
The basic method of calculating local airflows, should this route be taken,
is given in BS 5345, Part 5 which gives a method for pressurized apparatus
with an internal source of release. This method is not suitable for calculation
of the total airflow necessary within the house, as the analyser house, will
be much larger than the enclosure of an item of apparatus in relation to the
volume of released gas and thus the dilution performance would not be
the same. If, however, the air provision is local to the leak it will be more
relevant.
Q = F x (A/lOO) x (100/LEL) x S
m3/5
where
Q = airflow needed
F = maximum release rate
m3/s
m3/s
Installation of pressurized apparatus 56 1
A = percentage of gas in release (where the release
is not a mixture of gases this is 100)
LEL = lower explosive limit
S = safety factor (See BS/EN 60079-14)
%
%v/v
4
As already stated, this calculation should be carried out for each
component of the released gas mixture and the results added together
to give the necessary local gas flowrate. It must be remembered that, in
addition to these local air inputs, there must still be an overall input
to the analyser house to ensure that it is effectively purged before any
electrical apparatus is energized in common with all other pressurized
apparatus.
Although toxic matters are not within the scope of this book it is worthy of
note here that the use of the above formula using the maximum acceptable
gas level for toxic risks, instead of the lower explosive limit, will often
ensure proper dilution of toxic elements in any release. This is important
in view of the personnel access although this must be proved in each case
by test or assessment.
There are two approaches to provision of proof that analyser houses are
suitable for their use. The first approach is to carry out dilution tests similar
to those carried out for pressurized apparatus with internal release with the
normal airflow passing through the house and, by doing this, show that
dilution takes place in an acceptably small area which includes no electrical apparatus and is not one where personnel are expected to be present.
Certification/approval is currently optional in this case and a route exists
whereby the user can, by evidence obtained from similar analyser houses,
assess the suitability of the airflow in the analyser house without the need
for testing. In such circumstances, it should be ensured that the evidence of
similar situations is complete and relevant. The use of the equation detailed
above may well form part of such an assessment although the actual positioning of the air duct in each case is important. It should be as close to
the source of release as possible and direct its flow away from electrical
apparatus in the immediate vicinity and from areas where personnel may
be present.
The second method is to divide the house into two sections, one of which
contains the sources of release and the other the majority of the electrical
equipment. Personnel would then only have normal access to the part of the
house with the majority of the electrical equipment. The airflow in the other
part could then be much higher or the few electrical circuits in that part
protected for use in explosive atmospheres. Typical approaches to analyser
house construction are shown in Fig. 19.6 and 19.7.
Personnel protection
The toxic threshold level of many if not most of the flammable gases and
vapours which occur in industry is very much lower than their lower
562 Electrical installations in hazardous areas
Fig. 19.6 One-part analyser house
Main enclosure
Fig. 19.7 Two-part analyser house. Notes: (1) This door must be gastight and
secured closed so that normal access is not possible. (2) Wiring and
sensing devices must be otherwise protected (e.g., flameproof) if they
enter the dilution area. If this is the case, pressurization is not necessary
in this part of the house unless personnel require access. (3) The pressure
in this part of the house must always be higher by 50N/m2 than that of
the other part
explosive limit. If the gases and vapours released are toxic then the approach
should be to apply the criteria which would be necessary in any other
indoor situation where toxic risks occur. These can be applied alongside
the protection against explosion risks but should not dilute them. If it is
not possible to apply both then an alternative solution should be adopted.
As already stated, it may be possible to cover the toxic risk by using the local
airflow to dilute the toxic gas/vapour to below its occupational exposure
limit9 by using the calculation already described.
Installation of pressurized apparatus 563
79.70.2Analyser house construction and protection
It is not really relevant to test analyser houses in the same way as other
pressurized apparatus although the same criteria apply in that they should
be sufficiently strong to prevent damage in service and must provide the
appropriate degree of protection by enclosure required for the risk at their
point of installation with the pressurization off. (IT54for normal outdoor
situations rising to IP65 for such areas where dust risks occur). This does
not, of course, include the air outlet but it should be fitted with some device
to ensure that moisture or dust cannot enter when pressurization is off.
Analyser houses additionally require local alarms to ensure that personnel
inside know if the airflow or pressure falls below the acceptable minimum
but require a delay of around one or two minutes before electrical shutdown to permit people to enter and leave as pressure in the analyser house
and flow in the exit ducting will fall at such times. An override is necessary
to allow maintenance work but this should be secure to ensure it cannot be
inadvertently used.
The problem of personnel being trapped in the analyser house also needs
attention and an emergency exit such as a second door or kick-out panel,
should be fitted at the end of the house remote from the normal door. To
avoid operational problems it is recommended that the second exit be such
that it cannot be used in normal service and both exits should be fitted with
alarms which identify when they are open. Lighting which is protected by
another protection concept needs to be provided for emergencies as does
some secure form of protected communication.
Because of the internal release the interior of the analyser house should be
considered as Zone 1 in respect of all electrical apparatus installed within
it and remain energized when no airflow is present, and all apparatus not
so protected must be isolated when airflow fails (with the delay already
identified as necessary) even if the enclosure is installed in Zone 2 or 22. A
typical electrical installation is shown in Fig. 19.8.
19.1 1 Pressurized rooms
Pressurization is sometimes used for such things as control rooms where
no internal source of release occurs. These are not enclosure in the sense of
‘pressurized enclosures’ but the protection technique is similar. The basic
requirements for strength, keeping out the dust and environment apply
and, in this case, special attention is necessary to ensure that no excessive
leaks occur at such points as windows and cable inlets. Because such rooms
f
are usually very important to the operation o a plant it is not normally
possible to isolate all electrical equipment therein if the pressurization fails.
This leads to a main and stand-by pressurization system being necessary
to give a very high integrity to the pressurization, together with the need
for an airlock at points of entry to minimize the risk of ingress even if
both pressurization systems fail. Utilization of both of these precautions is
564 Electrical installations in hazardous areas
To pressurization
control unit
Start/stop button
utside but local to house)
G
,
Emergency light (note 1)
Flow switch (Note 2)
and pressure switch
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Domestic consumer unit
w
Air inlet
with
heater if
necessary
1z-7------50 V TFR+ Sockets
I
Annlvser home
Fig. 19.8 Typical analyser house electrical installation. Notes: (1) The emergency
light must remain on when pressurization fails and when main electrical
supplies fail. It must be fed from a separate supply and explosion protected
(e.g., flameproof). (2) Pressure and flow switches must be explosion
protected (e.g., flameproof or intrinsically safe). (3) Alarm buzzer must
be explosion protected (e.g flameproof or intrinsically safe)
not intended to allow continuous use of the room without pressurization,
but to allow it to remain in operation long enough to allow a controlled
shut-down of the plant to be undertaken if the pressurization cannot be
re-applied within a short time (e.g., four hours). The use of such a room
without pressurization should be limited to as short a time as possible
(probably not longer than one day) and access should be restricted as far as
possible during that time. Entry points should have warning notices to alert
personnel to the fact that the doors must be kept closed and should be fitted
with alarms which sound if a door is deliberately propped or inadvertently
left open. The alarm need not sound during the period of normal entry.
Initial purging to remove any internal flammables before start-up is again
necessary and should be at least long enough to allow five times the room
volume in air to flow through the room. Pressure detectors and flow detectors similar in position and operation to those in analyser houses should
be fitted.
References
1 NEC
2 CENELEC
National Electrical Code (US). Chapter 5 ‘Special
Occupancies’, Article 500, hazardous (Classified)
Locations.
Centre Eurogeen de Normalization Electrique
Installation of pressurized apparatus 565
3 B 5501
S
Electrical Apparatus for Potentially Explosive Atmospheres. Part 1 (1977).General Requirements. Part 3
(1977). Pressurized Apparatus ‘p‘.
4 BS/EN 50016 (1995) Electrical Apparatus for Potentially Explosive Atmospheres. Pressurized Apparatus ’p’.
5 BS 5345
6 BS/EN 60079
Selection, Installation and Maintenance of Electrical Apparatus for Use in Potentially Explosive
Atmospheres (other than mining applications or
explosive processing and manufacture). Part 1
(1989). General recommendations. Part 5 (1983).
Installation and Maintenance Requirements for Electrical Apparatus Protected by Pressurization ’p’ and
by Continuous Dilution, and for Pressurized Rooms.
Electrical Apparatus for Explosive Gas Atmospheres. Part 14 (1997) Electrical Installations in
Explosive Gas Atmospheres other than mines)
7 BS/EN 50014 (1993) Electrical Apparatus for Potentially Explosive Atmospheres. General Requirements.
8 RoSPA/ICI
Engineering Codes and Regulations, Electrical
Installations in Flammable Atmospheres (1973).
Group C (Electrical) Volume 1.5.
Guidance note from the Health and Safety Executive.
9 EH 40
Occupational Exposure Limits. (Updated Regularly).